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Studies of risk in developing economies have focused on consumption fluctuations as a measure of
the value of insurance. A common view in the literature is that the welfare costs of risk and benefits
of social insurance are small if income shocks do not cause large consumption fluctuations. We
present a simple model showing that this conclusion is incorrect if the consumption path is smooth
because  individuals  are  highly  risk  averse.  Empirical  studies  find  that  many  households  in
developing countries rely on inefficient methods to smooth consumption, suggesting that they are
indeed quite risk averse. Hence, social safety nets may be valuable in low-income economies even
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Government policies diﬀer systematically between poorer and richer countries. One strik-
ing diﬀerence is the much smaller weight given to social insurance programs in low-income
economies (see Figure 1). In 1996, the average expenditure on social insurance as a fraction
of GDP in countries with below-median per capita income was 6.8 percent; the corresponding
ﬁgure in above-median countries was 18.5 percent. Social insurance spending as a fraction
of government expenditure is also signiﬁcantly higher in higher income economies.1
A large literature has examined the potential value of social insurance in developing
economies by estimating the eﬀects of income shocks on household consumption. The
presumption underlying this literature is that the welfare costs of risk, and therefore the
beneﬁts of social insurance, are determined by the extent to which income shocks cause
ﬂuctuations in consumption. A common view is that if consumption does not ﬂuctuate
very much to begin with, the potential welfare gains from smoothing consumption further
through social insurance must be quite small. Morduch (1995) remarks that, “The emerging
consensus of the empirical literature [on consumption-smoothing in developing economies]
is that holes in eﬀective [consumption] insurance exist... But, in general, the holes are a
good deal smaller than many had assumed... The results have clear policy implications. [If]
markets and alternative mechanisms do indeed provide reasonably good insurance and credit,
publicly provided ﬁnancial services and social security could crowd out private eﬀorts with
limited net gain to society.” The consensus on the empirical evidence has eroded somewhat
since Morduch’s review. More recent empirical studies have pointed out that consumption
drops may be larger, especially among vulnerable subgroups such as the poor (Ravallion and
Chaudhuri 1997, Morduch 1999). However, the general view that consumption ﬂuctuations
1See Chetty and Looney (2005) for additional details. For these ﬁgures, social insurance is deﬁned
as total expenditures on social security, disability insurance, unemployment insurance, insurance against
work-related injuries, and government provided health insurance. The source for these statistics is the
International Labour Organization (2000).
1give a measure of the value of additional insurance remains prevalent (see Gertler and Gruber
2002, Fafchamps 2003, and Cameron and Worswick 2003 for recent examples).
In this paper, we re-examine whether empirical results about risk and consumption ﬂuc-
tuations have clear policy implications. In particular, we show that the welfare gains from
increasing insurance cannot be directly inferred from the size of consumption drops. Indeed,
the value of insurance may be very large even in environments where consumption does not
ﬂuctuate much. To see the basic idea underlying our argument, consider two economies
w h e r ea g e n t sf a c et r a n s i t o r yi n c o m es h o c k s . I nt h eﬁr s tc a s e( ar i c hc o u n t r y ) ,a g e n t sh a v e
access to credit markets and networks that allow them to smooth consumption easily when
hit by a shock. In the second economy (a poor country), private market insurance is very
limited. However, households are close to a subsistence level of consumption, and are very
reluctant to cut consumption further when their income falls for fear of starvation. These
risk-averse households therefore use whatever methods they can to avoid a substantial con-
sumption drop (e.g. taking children out of school). In both of these cases, an econometrician
would observe a smooth consumption path in the data. However, in the latter case — where
the smoothness of consumption is the result of high risk aversion and not eﬃcient private in-
surance markets — social insurance could yield large welfare gains. Intuitively, these welfare
gains arise from reduced reliance on costly consumption-smoothing mechanisms, leading to
improvements such as greater education for children.
To formalize this idea, we adopt from the public ﬁnance literature a normative model
of social insurance developed in Baily (1978) and Chetty (2005). These studies show that
the welfare gain from social insurance (ignoring eﬃciency costs caused by distortions in
behavior) is determined by the product of the percentage consumption drop caused by the
shock (∆c
c )w i t ht h ec o e ﬃcient of relative risk aversion (γ) in a general class of stochastic
dynamic models. Hence, holding γ ﬁxed, a smoother consumption path (smaller ∆c
c )d o e s
in fact imply smaller welfare gains from social insurance. However, it is important to note
that γ and ∆c
c are inversely related. Highly risk averse households should be willing to take
2extremely costly measures to insure a smooth consumption path. Therefore, in order to
understand whether a social safety net is valuable, one must determine the reason that ∆c
c
is small. If it is small because agents have good private insurance (as in the rich country
example above), social insurance may indeed be unnecessary. But if ∆c
c is small because γ
is large (as in the poor country example), small consumption ﬂuctuations may belie large
welfare gains from insurance because the product γ ∆c
c could be quite large.
This result has practical relevance because many households in low-income countries are
close to a subsistence level of consumption and are forced to cut back on consumption of
basic necessities when their income falls. It is therefore plausible that consumption drops
greatly reduce welfare for these households, implying that γ is high. Consistent with this
claim, several studies (reviewed in section 3) have found that households in low-income
economies take very costly measures to avoid income risk and maintain consumption in
the face of income shocks, such as reducing expenditures on children’s education, putting
other household members into work, planting lower-risk but lower-yielding crops, or even,
as found by Miguel (2005), murdering elderly dependents. These results indicate that
social insurance could provide greater welfare gains than suggested by prior work even if
consumption is smooth in low-income economies.
It should be noted that the value of social safety nets in reducing the extent of such
ineﬃcient behaviors has been recognized in prior work (see e.g. Rosenzweig and Binswanger
1993, Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993, Morduch 1999). In fact, the World Bank’s “social
risk management” approach to social protection considers the costs of coping strategies in
determining the value of safety nets (Holzmann et. al. 2003) . However, existing studies
do not formally link this point to results from the consumption-smoothing literature as we
do here. This formal link is useful in clarifying how evidence on consumption smoothing
and costly behaviors can be combined to obtain a more precise understanding of the welfare
consequences of social insurance.
I ti si m p o r t a n tt ok e e pi nm i n dt h a tt h ee ﬃciency costs of social insurance — e.g., reduced
3employment or opportunity costs such as forgone infrastructure or health investments —
may be very large. Since we do not discuss these costs here, one cannot directly conclude
from the results that introducing a large safety net will raise net welfare. Hence, the most
important lesson of this study is simply that small consumption ﬂuctuations need not imply
that existing insurance is “adequate” in developing economies. In fact, the converse may
be true: consumption may be smooth precisely because the welfare costs of consumption
ﬂuctuations are very high.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section sketches a simple
m o d e lo fi n c o m es h o c k sa n dd e r i v e saf o r m u l af o rt h ew e l f a r eg a i n sf r o ms o c i a li n s u r a n c e
following Chetty (2005). Section 3 shows how small consumption ﬂuctuations can arise
from either good private insurance or high risk aversion, with very diﬀerent implications for
optimal policy. Section 4 oﬀers concluding remarks.
2 A Normative Framework
We derive a formula for the marginal welfare gain from implementing a social insurance
program in a highly stylized model. The simplicity of the model is purely for expositional
ease; as we discuss below, the formula that we obtain actually holds in a very general class
of dynamic models.
Consider a static expected utility model of income shocks. Suppose the agent has utility
over consumption u(c). Let the disutility of obtaining $c of consumption be given by a
linear function
ψ(c)=θc
A negative shock — such as bad weather, illness, crop damage, or unemployment — can be
modeled in this framework as an increase in θ, which makes earning money more diﬃcult. In
the good state, θ captures the disutility of eﬀort required to generate income under normal
4conditions. In the bad state, θ rises because generating $c of consumption requires more
costly activities such as planting new crops, searching for another job, increasing labor supply
of other household members, reducing human capital or health investments in children.
To simplify the notation, suppose that there are two states (good rainfall and bad rain-
fall), with θb > θg =1 . With this normalization, θb can be interpreted as how much more
diﬃcult it is to earn money in the bad state than the good state. For example, θb =2
implies that the disutility of generating consumption is doubled when there is little rain.
Let p denote the probability that the bad state occurs.
In this model, consumption will generally diﬀer in the bad state and the good state if
private insurance markets are incomplete. Let cb denote consumption in the bad state and
cg consumption in the good state. An actuarially fair insurance program that raises cb by
$1 must lower cg by
p
1−p. The marginal welfare gain from this program is given by
f W = pu







This measure has no cardinal interpretation s i n c ep r e f e r e n c e sa r eu n i q u eo n l yu pt oa na ﬃne
transformation of u. One intuitive way to convert this expression to a money metric is
to normalize this welfare gain by the welfare change from a $1 increase in consumption in
the good state, which equals (1 − p)u0(cg).H o l d i n g p ﬁxed, the welfare gain from social
















cb is the average observed consumption drop, and γ = −u00
u0 cg is the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion. The intuition for this formula is straightforward: The marginal
welfare gain from $1 of insurance (or, conversely, the welfare cost of an income shock)
depends on the size of consumption ﬂuctuations (∆c
c ) and the utility value of having a
smoother consumption path (γ).
This simple formula holds in a much more general setting than the model above. Chetty
(2005) analyzes a general dynamic lifecycle model where agents maximize expected lifetime
utility and face income shocks based on an arbitrary stochastic process. Agents have utility
over consumption and N other arbitrary choice variables and face M arbitrary constraints
(e.g. borrowing constraints) in making their decisions. In this environment, Chetty shows
that the marginal beneﬁt of social insurance is given precisely by (1) under some weak
regularity conditions. It follows that this result applies even in the presence of informal
insurance arrangements, credit constraints, or non-traditional assets such as livestock (as in
Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993). This is because individual optimization and the envelope
theorem guarantee that at the margin, other behavioral responses and constraints have no
ﬁrst-order eﬀects on welfare (see Chetty 2005 for details). Hence, (1) provides a robust
guide for welfare analysis.
The next section uses this formula to examine the relationship between the size of the
consumption drop (∆c
c ) and the welfare gain from social insurance (W).
3 How Large is the Welfare Gain from Insurance?
Starting with Cochrane (1991) and Townsend (1994), a large literature has tested whether
private insurance markets are complete. These studies estimate ∆c
c by examining the eﬀect
of idiosyncratic shocks such as job loss, health changes, or weather shocks on consumption
growth. Townsend’s study of Indian farmers and other subsequent studies ﬁnd that ∆c
c is
in the range of 10-15 percent for moderate-sized temporary shocks in developing economies
6(Deaton 1992, Paxson 1992, Chetty and Looney 2005). In contrast, Ravallion and Chaudhuri
(1997) argue that Townsend’s methods understate the true size of consumption drops because
of measurement error and other econometric problems. Jalan and Ravallion (1999) ﬁnd that
the size of consumption drops varies sharply across income groups, with much larger drops
among the poorest households. While empirical results vary, the important point is that
evidence of small consumption ﬂuctuations is uniformly taken to imply that the welfare cost
of income risk is low. Hence, the general presumption is that the potential welfare gain from
social insurance against transitory income shocks is limited if ∆c
c is small (see e.g. Morduch
1995, Cameron and Worswick 2003).
The formula derived above shows that ∆c
c is only one parameter that determines the
beneﬁts of social insurance. The marginal welfare gain from insurance depends on the
product of γ and ∆c
c . This observation is important because γ and ∆c
c are inversely related —
it is precisely in situations where γ is high that agents will try to keep ∆c
c small. To see the
normative consequences of this point, consider a parametric example of the model outlined




























7This expression shows that ∆c
c is decreasing in γ and increasing in θb.I n t u i t i v e l y , h i g h
γ makes consumption reductions particularly costly, and the agent therefore exerts greater
eﬀort in the bad state to maintain consumption close to cg. Similarly, high θb makes
earning income in the bad state particularly costly, making it preferable to tolerate a larger
consumption drop. These comparative statics indicate that the ∆c
c observed in developing
economies could be small for two independent reasons: (1) θb is low, i.e. agents are able to
easily and inexpensively smooth consumption by borrowing or through informal insurance
mechanisms or (2) γ is high, i.e. agents are very risk averse to ﬂuctuations and work hard
to have a small consumption drop even though θb m i g h tb eh i g h . I nc a s e1 ,t h em a r g i n a l
welfare gain from social insurance γ ∆c
c is likely to be small. In contrast, in case 2, the gain
from social insurance could be quite large even if ∆c
c is small because γ m a yb ev e r yh i g h .
Table 1 illustrates this point quantitatively by showing simulations of the implied con-
sumption drop and welfare gain for a range of γ and θb. P a r tAo ft h eT a b l es h o w st h a ta
relatively small consumption drop of ∆c
c ≈ 10 − 15 percent can be generated by a variety of
combinations of γ and θb, indicated in bold on the diagonal of the table. Part B shows that
the welfare implications implied by the diﬀerent combinations above can vary widely. With
high γ and θb, the marginal gain in expected utility from the provision of an extra dollar of
social insurance can be three times as large as the gain with low γ and θb.
To understand this point intuitively, consider two diﬀerent descriptions of an economy,
both of which could generate a consumption drop of 10 percent. In the ﬁrst scenario (low γ,
low θb), agents have access to credit markets and informal village-level networks that allow
them to smooth consumption easily when hit by a shock. In this case, a mandated social
insurance program would simply crowd out existing private market arrangements, with little
net welfare gain. In the second scenario (high γ,h i g hθb), private market insurance arrange-
ments are very poor. However, households are close to a subsistence level of consumption
even in the good state and are therefore very reluctant to cut consumption further when
they are hit by a shock. They therefore use costly, high θ, methods to avoid a substantial
8consumption drop, such as taking children out of school or sending additional households
members into the labor force. In the second scenario, the provision of social insurance could
yield large welfare gains despite the smoothness of consumption, because such programs
reduce reliance on costly consumption-smoothing mechanisms when hit by shocks.
Which of these two scenarios for consumption smoothness actually applies to developing
economies? Although formal empirical tests to answer this question are outside the scope of
this paper, it is worth brieﬂy reviewing some existing work that provides suggestive evidence
on this issue. First, several studies have found that households reduce consumption of
necessities such as rice and other staples when income falls (Beegle, Frankenberg, and Thomas
2000, Frankenberg, Smith, and Thomas 2003, Chetty and Looney 2005). Consumption of
these goods would presumably be reduced only in the most dire straits, suggesting that
marginal utility must rise sharply as consumption falls for these households.
Second, studies that examine how people cope with income risk provide information
about risk aversion. These studies, which are reviewed in Dercon (2002) and Fafchamps
(2003), generally ﬁnd that households often use costly (high θ) methods to smooth income
and smooth consumption. Frankenberg, Thomas, Beegle (1999), Thomas et. al. (2004),
and Chetty and Looney (2005) ﬁnd that households reduce spending on children’s education
to mitigate unemployment shocks. Kochar (1999), Beegle, Frankenberg, Thomas (2000),
Cameron and Worswick (2003), Frankenberg, Smith, and Thomas (2003) document sizable
labor supply responses to mitigate income losses. Perhaps most strikingly, Miguel (2005)
reports evidence suggesting that some households resort to murder of elderly dependents
(“witches”) to smooth temporary income losses caused by droughts. There is also evidence
that households take measures ex-ante to avoid risk. Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993)
show that poor households in India adopt less risky farming methods at considerable expense
to farm proﬁtability. Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) argue that Indian families marry their
daughters to grooms in distant villages as an insurance mechanism.
Based on the model, this evidence that households resort to costly smoothing methods
9suggests that γ is high. Intuitively, if households are willing to take very costly measures
to maintain consumption when income falls, they must be very averse to a reduction in
consumption. Miguel’s ﬁndings are a particularly provocative example of this point: if
households “smooth” consumption by killing dependents whom they identify as “witches,”
then the beneﬁts of insurance would clearly be large even if ∆c
c is small.
In short, much of the existing evidence on behavioral responses to shocks point in favor
of the high γ explanation in situations where consumption is truly smooth. If risk aversion
is indeed as high as these studies suggest, social insurance could have substantial welfare
beneﬁts in developing economies. While the evidence reviewed above does not deﬁnitively
prove that γ is high, it at least suggests that this possibility deserves careful examination.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has shown how existing reduced-form empirical results from the development
literature can be used in a simple but general normative framework to evaluate the beneﬁts
of social insurance. The central lesson that emerges from this analysis is that estimates of the
consumption ﬂuctuations associated with shocks are inadequate to compute the welfare gains
from social insurance. It is equally important to determine the motives and mechanisms of
consumption smoothing — good private or informal insurance markets (low θb) or high risk
aversion (high γ)?
While further research on this issue is needed before drawing ﬁrm policy conclusions,
existing evidence on smoothing mechanisms suggests that at least some households in de-
veloping economies are highly risk averse. Hence, provision of social insurance could raise
welfare by reducing ineﬃcient behaviors ex-ante and ex-post. Importantly, implementing
some types of social insurance may be feasible without introducing signiﬁcant moral hazard
costs. For instance, detailed local data on weather is already collected in many low-income
countries (e.g. through the African Famine Early Warning System). If the costs of creating
10an insurance program that transfers funds on the basis of objective weather measures are
small, such a system could oﬀer signiﬁcant welfare gains.
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13A. Consumption Drop (∆c/c)
Coefficient of relative risk aversion (γ)
12345
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.25 0.20 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.04
effort in unemp. 1.5 0.33 0.18 0.13 0.10 0.08
state (θb) 1.75 0.43 0.24 0.17 0.13 0.11
2 0.50 0.29 0.21 0.16 0.13
B. Marginal Welfare Gain (γ∆c/c)
Coefficient of relative risk aversion (γ)
12345
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.25 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22
effort in unemp. 1.5 0.33 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.39
state (θb) 1.75 0.43 0.49 0.51 0.52 0.53
2 0.50 0.59 0.62 0.64 0.65
NOTE-Panel A shows the implied consumption drop without social insurance for various
combinations of risk aversion and disutility of effort to earn income in the bad state for the
stylized model in section 4.  The table shows that many combinations of risk aversion
and disutility of effort can generate consumption drops similar to those observed in the data (in
bold on diagonal).  Panel B shows the marginal welfare gains of social insurance for each comb-
ination of parameters.  Welfare gains are rising on the diagonal even though the consumption drop
is constant.
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Figure 1


















NOTE–Social Insurance statistics are from ILO (2000). Social insurance is defined as
total expenditures on social security, disability insurance, unemployment insurance,
insurance against work-related injuries, and government provided health insurance.
GDP statistics are from the Penn World tables. GDP is measured in PPP-adjusted
1996 US dollars.